Martin J. Brabers
Henny Qadeer Khan
Abdul Qadeer Khan[note 1] (Urdu: ڈاکٹر عبد القدیر خان; b. 1 April 1936); DEngr, NI (twice), HI, FPAS; also respectfully known in Pakistan as Mohsin-e-Pakistan (in Urdu: محسن پاکِستان; lit: Savior of Pakistan), more popularly known as Dr. A. Q. Khan, is a Pakistani nuclear scientist and a metallurgical engineer, colloquially regarded as the founder of HEU based Gas-centrifuge uranium enrichment programme for Pakistan’s integrated atomic bomb project. Founded and established the Kahuta Research Laboratories (KRL) in 1976, he was both its senior scientist and the director-general until his retirement in 2001, and was an early and vital figure in other science projects. Apart from participating in atomic bomb project, he made major contributions in molecular morphology, physical martensite, and its integrated applications in condensed and material physics.
Abdul Qadeer Khan was one of Pakistan’s top scientists, and was involved in the country’s various scientific programmes until his debriefing. In January 2004, Khan was officially summoned for a debriefing on his suspicious activities in other countries after the United States provided evidences to the Pakistan Government, and confessed it a month later. However, it has been alleged that these activities were government sanction, though the Pakistan government sharply dismissed the claims. After years of debriefing, the Islamabad High Court (IHC) on 6 February 2009 declared Abdul Qadeer Khan to be a free citizen of Pakistan, allowing him free movement inside the country. The verdict was rendered by Chief Justice Sardar Muhammad Aslam. In September 2009, expressing concerns over the Islamabad High Court‘s decision to end all security restrictions on Khan, the United States warned that Khan still remains a “serious proliferation risk”.
Khan was born in Bhopal, India (then British Indian Empire) into a Pashtun, but Urdu-speaking family in 1936. His father Dr. Abdul Ghafoor Khan was an academic who served in the Education Ministry of the British Indian Government and after retirement in 1935, settled permanently in Bhopal State. After the partition in 1947, the family emigrated from India to Pakistan, and settled in West-Pakistan. Khan studied in Saint Anthony’s High School of Lahore, and then enrolled at the D.J. Science College of Karachi. There, he took his double BA degree in Physics and in Mathematics under the supervision of physicist Dr. Bashir Syed. In 1956, he attended Karachi University and obtained a B.S. degree in Metallurgy in 1960 and subsequently got the internship at the Siemens Engineering.
After the graduation, he was employed by the Karachi Metropolitan Corporation and worked as an city inspector of weight and measures in Karachi, Pakistan. In 1961, he went to West Berlin to study Metallurgical engineering at the Technical University Berlin. In 1967, Qadeer Khan obtained an engineer’s degree in technology from Delft University of Technology in the Netherlands, and a doctorate engineering in Metallurgical engineering under the supervision of Martin Brabers from the Catholic University of Leuven, Belgium, in 1972. Qadeer Khan’s doctoral dissertations were written in fluent German. His doctoral thesis dealt and contained the fundamental work in martensite, and its extended industrial applications to the field of Morphology, a field that studies the shape, size, texture and phase distribution of physical objects
Research in Europe
In 1972, the year he received his doctorate, Abdul Qadeer Khan through a former university classmate, Friedrich Tinner, and a recommendation from his old professor and mentor, Martin J. Brabers, joined the senior staff of the Physics Dynamics Research Laboratory in Amsterdam. At first, he was responsible for evaluating the high-strength metals to be used for centrifuge components. The Physics Laboratory was a subcontractor for URENCO Group, the uranium enrichment research facility at Almelo, Netherlands, which had been established in 1970 by the United Kingdom, Germany, and the Netherlands to assure a supply of enriched uranium for European nuclear reactors. According to one of Qadeer Khan’s closest theorist, Dr. Ghulam Dastigar Alam, pointed out that Qadeer Khan was highly proficient in German, French and English languages, and the Physics Laboratories administration gave him a handful set of drawing of a centrifuge machines for translation. Soon after, Qadeer Khan left the laboratories to join the senior scientific staff of the URENCO Group after URENCO offered him a prestigious position. There, Qadeer Khan was in charge and responsible for performing physics experiments on uranium metallurgy and was tasked to produce commercial-grade uranium usable for light water reactors. In the meantime, the URENCO Group gave drawings of centrifuges for the solution of engineering problems that URENCO’s engineers were facing. The URENCO facility used Zippe-type centrifuge technology to separate the fissile isotopes 235U from non-fissile 238U by spinning UF6 gas at up to 100,000RPM. Abdul Qadeer Khan’s academic and leading-edge research in metallurgy brought great laurels to URENCO Group. In a short span of time, Khan earned a great reputation there, and enjoyed a distinguished career at URENCO. One of his greatest achievements was to enhance and improve the efficiency of the gas-centrifuges, which he did all alone. URENCO enjoyed a great academic relationship with Dr. Qadeer Khan, and URENCO had Qadeer Khan as one of the most senior scientists at the research facility where he worked and researched. Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan was responsible for improving the efficiency of the centrifuges used by URENCO, and greatly contributed to the technological advancement of the Zippe technology, a technology that was developed by Gernot Zippe, a mechanical engineer, in the Soviet Union during the 1940s. URENCO granted Qadeer Khan access to the most restricted areas of its facility as well as to the most restricted and highly classified documentation on gas centrifuge technology. During this time, URENCO had granted this privilege to few of the senior academic scientists who were working in the highly secretive and classified research projects.
Uranium enrichment is an extremely difficult process, as 235U exists in natural uranium at a concentration of only 0.7%; for the purposes of most power-generation reactors the concentration of that isotope has to be increased about fivefold, to at least 3%. The trick is to isolate and shed a similar isotope known as 238U, which is barely 1% heavier. By spinning at very high speeds—electrically driven to 100,000 Rpm, in perfect balance, on superb bearings, in a vacuum, linked by pipes to thousands of other units doing the same—this is what the centrifuge achieves. Much of the technical details of these centrifuge systems are regulated as secret information and subject to export controls because they could be used for the purposes of proliferation, and useful to make weapon-grade fuel for weapon making purposes.
1971 war and return to Pakistan
Main articles: Operation Smiling Buddha, Project-706, and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto#Father of the Nuclear weapons program
The clandestine and highly secretive atomic bomb project of Pakistan was given a start on 20 January 1972, when President (later Prime minister) Zulfikar Ali Bhutto chaired a secret meeting of academic scientists at Multan. Known as the Multan meeting where only senior scientists were delegated to meet with Bhutto, the atomic bomb project was launched under the administrative control of Bhutto, and the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (or PAEC) under its chairman, Munir Ahmad Khan. Earlier efforts were directed towards the implosion-type bomb with exploration of the Plutonium route. Abdul Qadeer Khan did not join the atomic bomb project whereas had no knowledge or information of this integrated atomic project until 1974, the controversy that highly doubts Abdul Qadeer Khan’s “father-like” claim. On 18 May 1974, India conducted a surprise nuclear test, codenamed Smiling Buddha, near Pakistan’s eastern border when Indian Premier Indira Gandhi gave verbal authorisation to the scientists at the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) to conduct a test of a device that they had built, the preparation was completed under extreme secrecy. The test was conducted at the long-constructed Indian Army base, known as Pokhran Test Range (PTR). It was only three years since Pakistan’s humiliating defeat in the 1971 Indo-Pak Winter war and the Winter war had put Pakistan’s mortal existence in great danger. This nuclear test, Smiling Buddha, greatly alarmed the Government of Pakistan. Prime minister Bhutto squeezed the time limit of the atomic bomb project from five years to three years, in a vision to evolved and derived the country’s scientific atomic project as from the “atomic capability to sustainable nuclear power”. Sensing the importance of this test, Munir Ahmad Khan secretly launched the Project-706, a codename of a secret uranium enrichment programme under the domain of the atomic project. The program’s first technical directorship was handed over nuclear engineer Sültan Mahmood of PAEC.
When the news reached to Abdul Qadeer Khan, he immediately went to the Pakistan consulate-general in Amsterdam and approached to Pakistan government officials where he offered to help Pakistan’s secret atomic bomb project. At first, he persuaded with a pair of PAF military scientists who were in the Netherlands to buy an air tunnel. At the consulate-general, the military scientists dissuaded him by quoting as “hard to find” a job in PAEC as a “metallurgist”.
Undaunted, Abdul Qadeer Khan wrote to Prime minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, highlighting his experience and encourages Prime Minister Bhutto to make an atomic bomb using uranium, rather than plutonium, the method Pakistan was trying to adopt under the leadership of Munir Ahmad Khan“. According to Kuldip Nayyar, although the letter was received by Prime minister Secretariat, Qadeer Khan was still unknown to the Government, leading Bhutto to ask the ISI to run a complete background check on Khan and prepare an assessment report on Khan and his profession. The ISI submitted its report and recommending Khan as an incompetent scientist in the field of nuclear technology based on his academic discipline. But, Bhutto was unsatisfied with ISI’s report and was eager to know more about Khan, therefore Bhutto asked Munir Ahmad Khan to dispatch a team of PAEC’s scientists to meet Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan. The PAEC intelligence team compromising Sultan Mahmood travelled to Amsterdam and arrived where Qadeer Khan was staying with his family at night and the discussion was held until the next day. The meeting was held the whole night, and the team returned to Pakistan the next day. Following this, Bhutto immediately decided to meet with Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, and directed a confidential letter to Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan. Soon after, Abdul Qadeer Khan took a leave from URENCO Group, and departed for Pakistan in 1974.
Initiation and atomic bomb project
Main article: Project-706
In December 1974, Abdul Qadeer Khan travelled to Pakistan and immediately went to Prime minister Secretariat without even stopping at the local hotel. The meeting was held at midnight and remained under extreme secrecy with only few knowing about it. There, Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan met with Zulfikar Bhutto, Munir Khan, and Dr. Mübaschir Hassan, Bhutto’s Science Adviser. During the meeting, Abdul Qadeer Khan enlightened the importance to Uranium and advocated the development of the atomic bomb using the highly-enriched uranium, but was unable to convince Bhutto to adopt uranium as the best approach rather than plutonium to make an atomic bomb. Many of the theorists at that time, including Munir Khan maintained that “plutonium and the nuclear fuel cycle has its significance”., and Munir Khan insisted that with the French extraction plant in the offing, Pakistan should stick with its original plan. Bhutto did not disagree, but saw the advantage of mounting a parallel effort toward enriched uranium. After Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan took off from the Prime minister Secretariat, Zulfikar Bhutto quietly told with his close friends Munir Ahmad Khan and Mübascher Hassan that, “He [Abdul Qadeer Khan] seems to make sense.” Next day early morning, another meeting was held where Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan persuaded again to Bhutto and tried to convince him to halt the plutonium pursuit, with other PAEC officials were also presented. At this final meeting with Zulfikar Bhutto, Qadeer Khan also advocated the development of specific kind of metalized uranium-based gun-type atomic bomb, which many of his fellow theorists said would be unlikely to work.
Prior to Abdul Qadeer Khan’s inclusion, the uranium route was considered secondary, with most efforts applied to develop a device with weapons-grade plutonium. In the spring of 1976, Abdul Qadeer Khan joined the atomic bomb project, and became part of the enrichment division at PAEC. After enrichment division’s director, Mahmood, briefed Khan on the project, the pair disagreed, and Abdul Qadeer Khan became highly unsatisfied with the work led by Mahmood. He wrote a letter to Munir Ahmad Khan, that was later directed to Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, in which he expressed his discontent with Mahmood informing that he wanted to work independently.
Kahuta Research Laboratories
Main article: Engineering Research Laboratories
Bhutto sensed great danger as the scientists were split between uranium and plutonium routes. Therefore, Bhutto called Abdul Qadeer Khan for a meeting, which was held at the prime minister secretariat. With the backing of Bhutto, Qadeer Khan took over the enrichment programme and renamed the project to Engineering Research Laboratories (ERL). Abdul Qadeer Khan insisted to work with the Corps of Engineers to lead the construction of the suitable operational enrichment site, which was granted. The E-in-C directed Brigadier Zahid Ali Akbar of Corps of Engineers to work with Qadeer Khan in Project-706. The Corps of Engineers and Brigadier Akbar quick acquired the remote city of Kahuta which had prestige of having being the dangerous mountainous area. The military realized the seriousness of the atomic experiments being performed in populated places therefore, Kahuta was an ideal and optimum location for physics experiments. Bhutto would later Brigadier Zahid Akbar to Major-General and handed over the directorship of the Project-706, with Qadeer Khan being its senior scientist.
On the other hand, the PAEC did not forgo the isotope separation program and a parallel programme was being directed by theoretical physicist Dr. G.D. Allam at Air Research Laboratories (ARL) located at Chaklala PAF base, though G.D. Allam had not seen a centrifuge, but only had a rudimentary knowledge of the Manhattan Project.
At first, the ERL suffered many setbacks, and heavily relied upon on the foreign assistance brought by Qadeer Khan. Meanwhile in April 1976, theorist Ghulam Dastigar Alam accomplished great feat by successfully rotating the first generation centrifuge to ~30,000 RPM. When the news were reached Qadeer Khan, he immediately requested to Bhutto for G.D. Alam’s assistance which was granted by the PAEC, first dispatching the team of scientists including G.D. Alam to ERL. At ERL, Qadeer Khan joined the team of theoretical physicists headed by theorist dr. GD Allam, working on the physics problems involving the differential equations in the centripetal forces and angular momentum calculations in the ultra-centrifuges. On 4 June 1978, the enrichment programme became fully functional after Dr. G.D. Alam succeeded in separated the 235U and 238U isotopes in an important physics experiment which Dr. A.Q Khan was also took part in and witnessed. In 1981, the ERL itself became fully functional instutition, passing the level of reactor-grade to weapons-grade production and manufacturing the first long metal rods of the fissile core. In 1981, when General Akbar was posted at General’s Headquarter (GHQ), Abdul Qadeer Khan took over the operations of ERL as its interim director and senior scientist. In 1983, Abdul Qadeer Khan’s appointment as director of ERL was personally approved by President Zia-ul-Haq and rename the ERL after his name, in conjunction to his honour.
Competition and scope of research
Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan is being honoured by President Farooq Leghari, 1996.
Despite his initiation and significance, Qadeer Khan was never in charge of the actual development of nuclear weapons, mathematical and physics calculations, development, and eventual weapons testing. The PAEC and its chairman Munir Ahmad Khan was officially put the atomic bomb project’s scientific director and oversaw the successful execution of the program by the mid 1980s. The government itself restricted to provide full scientific data of nuclear weapons to him and such scientific documents were never provided to him by his fellow theorists. The government had him required the government security clearance and clarifications of his visits of such secret weapons development sites, which he would be visiting with senior active duty officers. On contrary to his high expectation, the military instead approved to appointment of Major-General Zahid Ali as the scientific director of entire enrichment program. Later the outgoing General Zahid recommended Munir Khan appointment as the scientific director of atomic bomb project. This appointment came as a shock and surprised many in the government and the military as Munir Khan was not known to be aligned to conservative military.
From the outset, the military and the PAEC kept Qadeer Khan in dark and no knowledge was provided to him about the secret cold testings of the weapons and, in fact, Qadeer Khan was not invited or any one provided him the details, to the secret cold test of a nuclear device, codename Kirana-I that was conducted in March 1983 by the PAEC under Munir Ahmad Khan. In 1984, the KRL claimed to carry out its own nuclear cold test of a weapon, but this was seemed to be unsuccessful as PAEC had already carried out the test in 1983.
The PAEC’s senior scientist who worked with him and under him, remember him as “an egomaniacal lightweight” given to exaggerating his scientific achievements in centrifuges. At one occasion, he had severe confrontation and disagreement on the scientific methods of the centrifuges, with much senior theorist dr. Allam who doubted Qadeer Khan’s knowledge on mathematics and physics. At one point, Munir Khan once said that, “most of the scientists who work on the development of atomic bomb projects were extremely “serious”. They were sobered by the weight of what they don’t know; Abdul Qadeer Khan is a showman.” During the timeline of atomic bomb project, Qadeer Khan pushed his research into rigorous theoretical physics calculations and topics to compete, but yet failed to impress his fellow theorists at PAEC, generally at the the physics community. Later in years, Abdul Qadeer Khan had became a staunch critic of Munir Ahmad Khan’s research in physics, and on many different occasions, he had tried unsuccessfully to remove Munir Khan’s role in the atomic bomb projects. Their scientific rivalry became common and widely popular in the physics community and seminars held in the country over the years; The Atlantic Monthly described the two as mortal enemies.
Uranium tests: Chagai-I
As the competition between KRL and PAEC became highly intensified when neighbouring India conduct a series of tests of its nuclear bombs, codename Pokhran-II, in 1998 in long-constructed Indian Army Pokhran Test Range. These nuclear tests conducted by India caused great alarm and internal tension in Pakistan. Nawaz Sharif, Prime minister at that time, came under intense media and public pressure to conduct its own nuclear tests. After the Indian nuclear weapons tests, Abdul Qadeer Khan repeatedly met with Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, trying for permission to test Pakistan’s nuclear weapons in Chagai. He proposed the idea that the tests could by carried out in the underground tunnels in Kahuta. But it was denied by the government as well as the Pakistan Defence Forces as too aggressive. Despite his efforts, Sharif instead chose PAEC, under Dr. Ishfaq Ahmad, due to their experience of ingeniously carrying out the tests in the past.
When the news reached to him that PAEC has been tasked with the testings, furious Qadeer Khan was badly upset and frustrated with the Prime minister. Without wasting a minute, Qadeer Khan reached to Joint Staff Headquarters (JS HQ) where he met with chief of army staff General Jehängir Karamat, where he lodged a strong protest and grievousness to the chief of army staff. General Karamat then called the Prime minister, and Prime minister decided that KRL scientists, including Dr. A.Q. Khan, would also be involved in the nuclear test preparations and present at the time of testing alongside those of the PAEC. In meantime, Sharif sought to mitigate the intense rivalry between PAEC and KRL by asking Khan to provide its enriched uranium to PAEC. Prime minister Sharif also urged both KRL and PAEC to work together in the nation’s best interest. It was the KRL’s HEU that ultimately led to the successful detonation of Pakistan’s first nuclear devices on 28 May 1998, under codename Chagai-I. Two days later, on 30 May, a small team of scientists belonging to PAEC, under the leadership of Dr. Samar Mubarakmand, a plutonium nuclear device, codename Chagai-II. The sum of forces and yields produced by devices were around ~40.0kt of nuclear force, with the largest weapon producing around 35-36kn of force. In contrast, the single plutonium device had produced the yield of ~20.0kt of nuclear force and had much more bigger impact as compared to uranium devices. In an interview and the thesis written in his book, Khan maintained that eye-witnessing the nuclear tests, and becoming of Pakistan as nuclear power, were the happiest, finest, and most glorified days of his life.
 Proliferation of URENCO technology
See also: Atomic proliferation
Abdul Qadeer Khan then established an administrative proliferation network through Dubai to smuggle URENCO technology to Engineering Research Laboratories. In 1998, his fellow theorist Dr. G.D. Alam, issued a confessional statement to the public media and made first public acknowledgment of A.Q. Khan’s nuclear proliferation work, where he maintained that the “blueprints were incomplete and did not contain the scientific information needed even for the basic gas-centrifuges.” According to one scientist, the URENCO Group’s blueprints of centrifuges were based on first generation technology and were filled with many of the serious technical errors. Its SWU rate was extremely low that it would have to be rotated for thousands RPMs on the cost of taxpayer’s millions of dollars, Allam maintained. The team compromising his fellow theorists, contained Tasnim Shah and Qadir Hussain, head by theorist G.D. Alam, had developed an improvised but powerful version of the centrifugal machines, and Abdul Qadeer Khan had nothing to do with it. Many of Qadeer Khan’s colleagues were irritated that he seemed to enjoy taking full credit for something he had only a part in, and many of his fellow scientists were transferred back to PAEC as they had developed serious disagreements with Abdul Qadeer Khan over his nuclear proliferation activities.
In 1980, a foreign government from an unknown Arab country contacted Dr. A.Q. Khan, offering a large sum of money. While, Qadeer Khan took the proposal under consideration, he asked his fellow scientists in his scheme, including Alam. When Qadeer Khan accepted the proposal, one scientist notified the President Zia-ul-Haq about his recent activities in other countries. In his statement, Ghulam Dastigar Alam said, “To this day, Dr. A.Q. Khan knows nothing about the topics in the “(modern) physics” apart from the introductory physics. He still lacks the knowledge to speak about topics involved in the nuclear physics.”
Abdul Qadeer Khan was known for enjoying taking full credit of something he had done a part in, and often getting engrossed in projects which were theoretically interesting but practically unfeasible. About his full role in the atomic bomb project, physicist Samar Mubarakmand maintained in 2004 that:
“Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan first visited Chagai on May 28, 1998. He arrived 15 minutes prior to the tests… The Theoretical Physics Group (TPG) of PAEC that worked on the design of the bomb and developed the whole programme. Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan was only tasked with the enrichment project that he had taken over in 1976. If he knew how to build the designs of weapons, Iraq, Libya and Iran would have developed the weapons by now.
 Suspicions of outside involvement
The successful development of a uranium enrichment programme rapidly attracted the attention of the outside world and observers suspected outside assistance. But, due to lack of evidence, the report did not receive any attention. Suspicions soon fell on Qadeer Khan’s knowledge obtained in URENCO Group. In 1983, Qadeer Khan was sentenced in absentia to four years in prison by the local court in Amsterdam for attempted espionage. When the news reached to Pakistan, Barrister SM Zafar, at his own expense, immediately traveled to Amsterdam to fight the case of Qadeer Khan and filed a petition at the Court. Zafar, teamed with Khan’s old mentor professor Martin Brabers and his universities administration, where Zafar prepared for the case. At the trial, Zafar and Martin argued that the technical informations taken by Qadeer Khan are commonly found and taught in undergraduate and doctoral physics at the university. After series of hearing, the sentence was later overturned on appeal on a legal technicality by the Court. Reacting on the case, Qadeer Khan stated: “I had requested for it as we had no library of our own at KRL, at that time”. Furthermore, Qadeer Khan strongly rejected any suggestion that Pakistan had illicitly acquired nuclear expertise: “All the research work [at Kahuta] was the result of our innovation and struggle. We did not receive any technical “know-how” from abroad, but we cannot reject the use of books, magazines, and research papers in this connection.” he said in 1990.
 U.S. objections
In an 1987 local interview, Qadeer Khan stated that: “United States had been well aware of success of atomic bomb quest of Pakistan.” He allegedly confirmed speculation, but the Pakistan Government sharply denied all claims made by Qadeer Khan. Following this, Qadeer Khan was summoned for a quick meeting with President Zia-ul-Haq, who used a “tough tone” and strongly urged Qadeer Khan to cease any information he’d been providing in statements, promising severe repercussions if he continued to leak harmful information against the Pakistan Government. Qadeer Khan immediately made several contacts with foreign newspapers, denying any and all statements he had previously released. In 1988, the United States terminated all economic and military aid to Pakistan, but the Benazir government reached an understanding with the United States to “freeze” the program which went effect on 1993. In 1990, the United States imposed sanctions on KRL, but all restrictions were uplifted in 2001 after country’s key logistic contribution against terrorism as being key ally of United States in the War on Terror. On July 1996, Qadeer Khan maintained, “at no stage was the program of producing nuclear weapons-grade enriched uranium ever stopped”.
 Expansion of network
In the 1980s, the reports on negotiation between People’s Republic of China and Pakistan for the sale of (UF6) and HEU fuel was surfaced in the media. Reports alleged that “A.Q. Khan had paid a visit to China to provide technical support in their nuclear program whilst aided in building the centrifuge facility in Hanzhong province. The Chinese government offered back the nuclear material, but Pakistan refused, calling it a “gift of gesture” to China. According to the independent IISS report, Zia had given a “free hand” to Qadeer Khan and given autonomous import and export access to him. The report showed that his acquisition activities were largely unsupervised by Pakistan governmental authorities; his activities went undetected for several years.
 North Korea, Iran and Libya
In 2003, Libya gave up the weapons-related material including the gas-ultra centrifuges. These gas-ultra centrifuges were marked as early models that Abdul Qadeer Khan developed in 1980s, known as PakSat-I.
The defence treaty between Pakistan and North Korea was signed in 1990 after Benazir Bhutto, Prime minister at that time paid a state visit to communist regime. The diplomatic relations with Communist Korea were established during the Zulfikar Ali Bhutto‘s period, a socialist democratic period in Pakistan. In 1990, it was reported that the highly sensitive centrifuge technology was being exported to North Korea in exchange for missile technologies. On multiple occasions, Qadeer Khan had alleged that, Benazir Bhutto had “issued clear direction” for that matter. In 1993, the downloaded secret information on uranium enrichment was delivered to North Korea in exchange for information on developing ballistic missiles.
In 1987, Iran wanted to purchase a fuel-cycle technology from Pakistan, but it was rebuffed. Zia calculated that the civil nuclear cooperation with Iran was purely a “civil matter” and maintaining good relations with Tehran. Zia did not further approve any nuclear deals, but Qadeer Khan secretively handed over the sensitive report on centrifuges in 1987–89. It was in 2003 that the nature of such agreement was made public The Iranian government came under intense pressure from the Western world to fully disclose its nuclear program; the country agreed to accept tougher inspections from the IAEA. The IAEA inspection showed that Iran had established a large uranium enrichment facility using gas centrifuges based on the URENCO designs, which had been obtained “from a foreign intermediary in 1989”. The intermediary was not named but many diplomats and analysts pointed to Qadeer Khan. The Iranians turned over the names of their suppliers and the international inspectors quickly identified the Iranian gas centrifuges as Pak-1′s, the gas centrifuges invented by Qadeer Khan during the atomic bomb projects.
In May 1998, after the Newsweek alleged that Qadeer Khan had sent designs of centrifuges toIraq, the United Nation officials apparently discovered documents. The Iraqi officials said the documents were authentic but that they had not agreed to work with Qadeer Khan, fearing an ISI sting operation, due to straining relations between two countries. The Government and Qadeer Khan strongly denied this allegation whilst the government declared the evidences to be “fraudulent“.
In 2000, Pakistan secretly transferred authentic evidences to Israel, whose [Pakistan] scientists had helped in building the nuclear program in Libya. In 2003, the IAEA successfully dismantled Libya’s nuclear program after persuading Libya to rolled back its program in order to have the economic sanctions uplifted. The Libyan officials turn over the names of its suppliers which also included Qadeer Khan. The same year, the Bush administration launch its investigation on Qadeer Khan’s leak in 2001 and 2002, focusing on Qadeer Khan’s personal role.
 Dismantlement and debriefings
The Libyan government officials were quoted as saying that “Libya had bought nuclear components from various black market dealers, including Pakistan’s”. The U.S. officials who visited the Libyan plants reported that the gas centrifuges were very similar to the Pak-1 centrifuges of Iran. By the time the evidences against Qadeer Khan had surfaced, he had become a public icon in the country and was the Science Adviser to the Government. His vigorous advocacy for atom bombs and missiles became an embarrassment to the Pakistan government, with the government itself was convinced that he had strengthened his network around the globe. On 31 January 2004, Qadeer Khan was suddenly dismissed from his post, and the government launched a full-fledged investigation on Qadeer Khan to ostensibly “allow a fair investigation” of the allegations. The Wall Street Journal quoted unnamed “senior Pakistan government officials” as conceding that Qadeer Khan’s dismissal from KRL had been prompted by the U.S. government’s suspicions.
On 4 February 2004, Qadeer Khan appeared on state-owned media Pakistan Television (PTV) and confessed to running a proliferation ring, and admitted to transferring technology to Iran between 1989 and 1991, to North Korea and Libya between 1991 and 1997.
Although not arrested, the national security hearings were launched by the joint law officers from JAG Branch. The debriefings also implicated the role of the former chief of army staff general Mirza Beg. The Wall Street Journal quoted U.S. government officials as saying that Qadeer Khan had told the military lawyers that “General Beg had authorized the transfers to Iran.”
 Revelation and confession
According to IISS reports, Qadeer Khan for several years, had security clearance over import and export operations which were largely unsupervised and undetected. Since 1970s, Abdul Qadeer Khan’s security was tightly bounded, while he never travel alone, he was accompanied by the secret members of the military establishment. On contrary, the centrifuge components were apparently manufactured in Malaysian Scomi Precision Engineering with the assistance of South Asian and German companies, and used a UAE-based computer company as a false front.
The investigations also led the exposure of many defunct European consortium who defied export restrictions in 1970s, and many of defunct Dutch companies exported thousands of centrifuges to Pakistan as early as 1976. The findings exposed the Israeli involvement in this scandal when the Israeli national Asher Karni was arrested, who used the same route to provide aide to Israeli nuclear program.
 Pardon and reaction
On 5 February 2004, President Musharraf pardoned him as he feared an extreme public reaction would be built if he’s not pardoned. The constitution of Pakistan allows the President of Pakistan to issue presidential pardons.
The debriefings of Qadeer Khan badly damaged the political credibility of President Musharraf and the image of the United States. While, the Pakistan media aired sympathised documentaries, the political parties on other hand, used that issue politically to bring down the Presidency of Musharraf. The U.S. Embassy had pointed out that the successor of Musharraf would be less friendly towards the United States; this refrained United States from applying further direct pressure on Musharraf due to a strategic calculation that may led the loss of Musharraf as an ally. On 11 February 2004, at the National Defense University, President Bush proposed to reform the IAEA to combat the nuclear proliferation; the Bush proposal was seen as targeted against Pakistan, which is an influential member of IAEA since 1960s and serves on the Board of Governors; it did not received attention from other world governments.
 IAEA calls
A series of strong calls were made by many senior IAEA officials, U.S. and European Commission politicians, for Abdul Qadeer Khan available for interrogation by IAEA investigators, given lingering scepticism about the disclosures made by Pakistan regarding Qadeer Khan’s activities. All requests were strongly dismissed by the Prime minister Shaukat Aziz and the government of Pakistan, terming it as “Case closed”.
In December 2006, the WMDC headed by Hans Blix, a former IAEA chief and UNMOVIC chief; said in a report that Abdul Qadeer Khan could not have acted alone “without the awareness of the Pakistan Government”. Blix’s statement was also reciprocated by the United States government, with one anonymous American government intelligence official quoting to independent journalist and author Seymour Hersh: “Suppose if Edward Teller had suddenly decided to spread nuclear technology around the world. Could he really do that without the American government knowing?”.
In 2008, in an interview, Qadeer Khan laid the whole blame on President Musharraf, and noting Musharraf as “Big Boss” for proliferation deals. In 2012, Qadeer Khan later involved Benazir Bhutto in the proliferation matters, pointing out to the fact as she had issued “clear directions in thi[s] regard.” Domestically and globally, it is generally believed that Qadeer Khan was made scapegoat by President Musharraf to prove his uttermost loyalty to the West whose support was urgently and desperately needed for the survival of his presidency. It was done so to protect the names of those high-ranking military officials and civilian politicians, under whom Musharraf served in the past.
 End of debriefings
The debriefings were suspended when General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani became the chief of army staff in 2007. The following year at the Joint Headquarters, senior joint military leaders unanimously voted for the termination of Qadeer Khan’s security hearings. Officially, all security hearings were terminated by the Chairman Joint Chiefs General Tärik Majid on November 2008. Abdul Qadeer Khan was never charged with espionage activities nor any criminal charges were pressed against him. The military maintained that the debriefings were the process of questioning Qadeer Khan to learn and dismantle the atomic ring. The details of debriefings were marked as “classified” and were quickly wrapped up quietly following the fall of General Pervez Musharraf. A complicating factor is that, few believed that Qadeer Khan acted alone and the affair risks gravely damaging the Armed Forces, which oversaw and controlled the nuclear weapons development and of which Musharraf was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, until his resignation from military service on 28 November 2007.
 Government work and political advocacy
Despite his controversies, Qadeer Khan was commuted by much of the scientific community, but was still quite welcome in the military science circles. In 2001, Musharraf awarded promotion to Abdul Qadeer Khan as the principle Science Adviser to the President. While this was regarded as a promotion, it removed him from hands-on management and allowed the government to keep a closer eye on his activities. Following his confession in 2004, Khan became a major international symbol of proliferation. Leading Western political correspondents, such as of Time magazine, feature its publication as the “Merchant of Menace”, labelled “the world’s most dangerous nuclear trafficker,” and in November 2005, the Atlantic Monthly ran “The Wrath of Khan”, featured a picture of a mushroom cloud behind Khan’s head on the cover.
But back in home, Abdul Qadeer Khan remained extremely populous figure and many saw as national hero of Pakistan. Science in Pakistan served as Pakistan’s extreme national pride, and Khan’s long association with science bought Khan a tremendous popularity.
The (meritorious) services of Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan are “unforgettable” for our beloved country, Pakistan….
—Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz Shukat Aziz came to publicly support Abdul Qadeer Khan in 2007, source
On a television speech in 2007, Prime minister Aziz paid a huge tribute to Abdul Qadeer Khan and while commenting on last part of his speech, Aziz stressed it: “(…)….The services of (nuclear) scientist… Dr. (Abdul) Qadeer Khan are “unforgettable” for the country..(..)….”. In 2012, Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan announced to form a a political party Movement to Protect Pakistan. In late 1980s, Abdul Qadeer Khan promoted the funding of the Pakistan’s integrated space weapons project and vigorously supported, and supervised the Hatf-I and Ghauri-I program.
Since his return to his homeland, Abdul Qadeer Khan elevated to became as country’s top scientist and involved in country’s scientific programmes for more than two decades. His long association with science in Pakistan has brought Khan a great laurels and an extreme popularity in Pakistan. Khan secured the fellowship and the presidency of Pakistan Academy of Sciences, whose fellowship is highly restricted to scientists. Through Pakistan Academy of Sciences, Khan published two books on metallurgy and material science. Khan began to published his articles from KRL in 1980s, and began to organise conferences on Metallurgy by inviting materiel scientists from all over the world. Gopal S. Upadhyaya, an Indian nuclear scientist and metallurgist as well, attended Khan’s conference in 1980s and personally met him along with Kuldip Nayar. In Upadhyaya’s words, Khan was a proud Pakistani who wanted to show the world that he and scientists from Pakistan are no inferior to any one in the world.
One of his notable contribution at the Ghulam Ishaq Khan Institute of Engineering Sciences and Technology when he served as the Project-Director of this university. After the construction of institute was completed, Khan took the Professorship of Physics while also served as the Chairman of Department of Metallurgy and Materials Science at the Ghulam Ishaq Khan Institute of Engineering Sciences and Technology. Later, Khan helped established the Dr. A. Q. Khan Institute of Biotechnology and Genetic Engineering at the Karachi University.
During his time in the atomic bomb project, Qadeer Khan pioneered his research in the condensed physics and co-authored articles in nuclear chemical reactions of the highly unstable isotopic particles in the controlled physical system. Qadeer Khan, along with other scientists, pioneered the research in nuclear thermodynamics to conduct studies in quantum mechanical behaviour of the nuclear particles. Abdul Qadeer Khan maintains his stance to use of controversial technological solutions to both military and civilian problems, including the use of military technologies for the civilian welfare. Khan also remained a vigorous advocate for defence strength through nuclear weapons and the Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence development as sparing his country the fate of Iraq or Libya. In his recent interview, Abdul Qadeer Khan maintained that he has no regrets for what he did and maintained that:
[P]akistan’s motivation for nuclear weapons arose from a need to prevent “nuclear blackmail” by India. Had Iraq and Libya been nuclear powers, they wouldn’t have been destroyed in the way we have seen recently…. If (Pakistan) had [atomic] capability before 1971, we [Pakistanis] would not have lost half of our country after a disgraceful defeat.
—Abdul Qadeer Khan, statement on 16 May 2011, published the Newsweek, 
Abdul Qadeer Khan faced heated and intense criticism from his fellow theorists whom he had worked with in the atomic bomb project, most notably theorist Dr. Pervez Hoodbhoy. In addition, Qadeer Khan’s false claims that he was the “father” of the atomic bomb project since its inception and his personal attacks on Munir Khan caused even greater animosity by his fellow theorists, and most particularly, within the general physics community towards Qadeer Khan.
In 1999, in an editorial essay written at Chowk.com, Hoodbhoy wrote:
…(…)…(sic)… Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, the pre-eminent architect of atomic bomb project….(…)…, is often called a “nuclear physicist” when, in fact, his degrees and academic accomplishments belong to the field of metallurgy, which is an engineering (discipline) rather than physics. When A.Q. Khan visited the Institute of Theoretical Physics of the Quaid-e-Azam University about two months ago, he endeared himself even more to his admirers by wistfully saying “he wished he could come someday to this university to study physics….”
 State honours
Because of Abdul Qadeer Khan’s open public promotion by the Pakistan media, he remained one of the most known scientist in the country. His active role in science, during the last two decades, Abdul Qadeer Khan stepped up into becoming the country’s top (nuclear) scientist.
 Selected research papers and patents
 Metallurgy and Materials science
- An X-ray diffraction study of stacking sequences, stacking faults and distortions in copper-based martensites – an application to Ci–Al and Cu–Al–Zn martensites. Journal of Applied Crystals, published with G.V.d. Perre, L. Delaey. H. Tas, W. Vandermeulen and A. Deruyttere, (in 1974).
- . The Hall-Petch relationship in copper-based martensites, Materials Science and Engineering, volume 15, (1974), written with M.J. Brabers and L. Delaey, pp. 263–274.
- Chromium Determination in Steel using an atomic absorption spectrophotometer? problems and their remedies, Pakistan Steel Journal, Vol 26, January–March 1986.
- Electrical and magnetic properties of double-aged 18% nickel maraging steels, Proceedings of The International Conf. on Martensitie Transformations (1986), The Japan Institute of Metals, pp. 572–577.
- Physical and mechanical properties of ultra-high strength 18% nickel maraging steel, vol.28, (July–September/October–December 1986). Pakistan Steel Journal, pp. 87–90.
- Hot stage electron microscopy of rapidly solidified Cu-Al-Ni ß-phase alloys, Proc. 2nd Beijing Conf. and Exhib. on Instrum. Analysis, 1987.
 Nuclear and Material physics
- Dilation investigation of metallic phase transformation in 18% Ni maraging steels, Proceedings of The International Conf. on Martensitie Transformations (1986), The Japan Institute of Metals, pp. 560–565.
- The spread of Nuclear weapons among nations: Militarization or Development, pp. 417–430. (Ref. Nuclear War Nuclear Proliferation and their consequences “Proceedings of the 5th International Colloquium organized by the Group De Bellerive Geneva 27–29 June 1985, Edited by: Sadruddin Aga Khan, Published by Clarendon Press-Oxford 1986).
- Flow induced vibrations in Gas-tube assembly of centrifuges. Journal of Nuclear Science and Technology, 23(9), (September 1986), pp. 819–827.
- Dimensional anisotropy in 18% of maraging steel, Seven National Symposium on Frontiers in Physics, written with Anwar-ul-Haq, Mohammad Farooq, S. Qaisar, published at the Pakistan Physics Society (1998).
- Thermodynamics of Non-equilibrium phases in Electron-beam rapid solidification, Proceedings of the Second National Symposium on Frontiers in Physics, written with A. Tauqeer, Fakhar Hashmi, publisher Pakistan Physics Society (1988).
- Khan, Abdul Qadeer (1972) (in English, German and Dutch). Advances in Physical Metallurgy. Amsterdam, Netherlands: Elsevier Press. ISBN 969-8500-00-6.
- Khan, Abdul Qadeer; Dr. Martin J. Brabers (1972) (in English, German and Dutch). Topics in Metallurgy. Amsterdam, Netherlands: Elsevier Press. ISBN 0196-8858.
- Khan, Abdul Qadeer (1983) (in English, German and Dutch). Metallurgical Thermodynamics and Kinetics. Islamabad, Pakistan: The Proceedings of the Pakistan Academy of Sciences. ISBN 978-969-35-0821-5.
- Khan, Abdul Qadeer; Syed Shabbir Hussain, Mujahid Kamran (1997). Dr. A.Q. Khan on science and education. Islamabad, Pakistan: Sang-e-Meel Publications. ISBN 978-969-35-0821-5.
 See also
- Nuclear proliferation
- Pakistan and weapons of mass destruction
- Right-wing politics in Pakistan
- Edward Teller
- ^ In Pakistan, Dr. A.Q. Khan is referred to as a Prominent atomic scientist, and Mohsin-e-Pakistan (in Urdu: محسن پاکِستان; English Translation: Savior of Pakistan). Stolen Dutch nuclear technologies. His name can be spell in various ways. The Pakistan Academy of Sciences (PAS) spelled his name as Abdul Qaudeer Khan as well Islamic Academy of Science also spelled his name in same manner. Other educational organization spelled his name as Abdul Qadir Khan or Abdul Kadeer Khan. Alternative pronunciations for his name are Gaudeer or either Gadeer. On the other hand, Khan’s birth certificate reads “Abdul Qadeer Khan”.
1. ^ “The Wrath of Khan – Magazine”. The Atlantic. 4 February 2004. http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200511/aq-khan/2. Retrieved 2010-09-26.
2. ^ a b (IISS), International Institute for Strategic Studies (2006). “Bhutto was father of Pakistan’s Atom Bomb Programme”. International Institute for Strategic Studies. http://www.iiss.org/whats-new/iiss-in-the-press/press-coverage-2007/may-2007/bhutto-was-father-of-pakistani-bomb/?locale=en. Retrieved 2011.
3. ^ a b c d e f g h i j Bernstein, Jeremy (28 May 2009). “He Changed History”. The New York Review of Books. http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2009/apr/09/he-changed-history/. Retrieved 2011.
4. ^ “Mush helped proliferate N-technology : AQ Khan”. The Times of India. 6 July 2008. http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2008-07-06/news/27723085_1_aq-khan-nuclear-proliferation-nuclear-technology.
6. ^ “IHC declares Dr A Q Khan a free citizen”. GEO.tv. 6 February 2009. http://geo.tv/2-6-2009/34508.htm. Retrieved 2010-09-26.
7. ^ Warrick, Joby Warrick (7 February 2009). “Nuclear Scientist A.Q. Khan Is Freed From House Arrest”. The Washington Post. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/02/06/AR2009020603730.html. Retrieved 2011.
8. ^ “Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, Founder and Ex-Chairman Dr. A Q Khan Research Laboratories”. Pakistanileaders.com.pk. Archived from the original on 29 September 2010. http://www.pakistanileaders.com.pk/profile/Abdul_Qadeer_Khan. Retrieved 2010-09-26.
9. ^ a b c d e f g h i “About Khan’s education, achievements and research”. Dr. A. Q. Khan. http://www.draqkhan.com.pk/about.htm.
10. ^ Khan, Abdul Qadeer, The effect of morphology on the strength of copper-based martensites, Doctor of Engineering thesis under the supervision of Professor Martin J. Brabers, Faculty of Applied Sciences of the University of Leuven, Leuven, Belgium, March 1972.
11. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p Rehman, Shahidur (May 1999) , “§Dr. A. Q. Khan: Nothing Succeed like Success”, Long Road to Chagai, Islamabad, Islamabad Capital Territory: Printwise Publications, p. 160, ISBN 969-8500-00-6
13. ^ a b c d e f g h i j Usman Shabbir (May 2004). “Remembering Unsung Heroes:§A.Q. Khan came on board”. Pakistan Military Consortium and http://www.pakdef.info/. The Pakistan Military Consortium. http://www.pakdef.info/nuclear&missile/munirahmad1.html. Retrieved 2011.
14. ^ a b c d e “The Wrath of Khan – Magazine”. The Atlantic. 4 February 2004. http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200511/aq-khan/3. Retrieved 2010-09-26.
15. ^ a b c d History Commons (Updated). “Profile: Abdul Qadeer Khan”. History Commons. http://www.historycommons.org/entity.jsp?entity=abdul_qadeer_khan.
16. ^ a b Nayar, Kuldip. “Do not give importance to Dr. A.Q. Khan”. Kuldip Nayar (only available in Urdu). Kuldip Nayar. http://criticalppp.com/archives/1425.
17. ^ a b c d Edward Nasim (23 July 2009). [Scientists of Pakistan “[with Sultan Bashir Mahmood]”]. season 1. 0:30 minutes in. Nawai-e-Waqt Media Network (NWMT). Captail Studios. Scientists of Pakistan.
18. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m Causar Nyäzie (May 1994) , “§9: The Reprocessing Plant—The Inside Story”, [1994 Last days of Prime minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto], 1, 1 (1 ed.), Islamabad, Islamabad Capital Territory: Maulana Causar Nyazie and Sani Panwjap, pp. 55–56, ISBN 969-8500-00-6, archived from the original on 2011, http://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&q=cache:wzM8bvjZK3MJ:www.bhutto.org/Acrobat/Last%2520Dayf%2520of%2520Premier%2520Bhutto.pdf+Last+days+of+Premier+Bhutto&hl=en&gl=us&pid=bl&srcid=ADGEESjckwrTw4dvTbVQ2FEflsRU20aldSdvHTlXvKXEg4jkiZqdwZrD_yaOBO8SkqEM8Dv-f2TL8N6Tri_NNszXlQJ_35yornnzkagXTmrJvjakcy984S3LgbVKQUDXLgEm9WGwFCWf&sig=AHIEtbQ8JmT-OzGeBtHj-U1-gM8pY0SJPA
19. ^ “Zulfikar Ali Bhutto”. Historycommons.org. http://www.historycommons.org/entity.jsp?entity=zulfikar_ali_bhutto_1. Retrieved 2010-09-26.
20. ^ Shabbir, Usman. “AQ Khan came on board.”. Pakistan Defence Consortium (Journal). Pakistan Defence Consortium. http://www.pakdef.info/nuclear&missile/munirahmad1.html. Retrieved 18 October 2012.
21. ^ a b c Khan, A. Qadeer (29 July 2009). “Bhutto, Zia-ul-Haq And Kahuta”. A.Q. Khan. draqkhan.com. http://draqkhan.com.pk/index.php/2009/07/bhutto-zia-ul-haq-aur-kahuta/.
22. ^ a b “A Science Odyssey: Pakistan’s Nuclear Emergence”. Samar Mubarakmand on AQ Khan. http://www.pakdef.info/nuclear&missile/science_odyssey.html. Retrieved 18 October 2012.
23. ^ a b c d e f g h [Shahid-ur-Rehman] (1999). “Dr. A. Q. Khan: Nothing Succeed like Success””. Long road to Chagai. Islamabad: Shahid-ur-Rehman, 1999. ISBN 969-8500-00-6..
24. ^ a b c John Pike. “A.Q. Khan”. Globalsecurity.org. http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/pakistan/khan.htm. Retrieved 2010-09-26.
25. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k Sublette, Carey; et. al (2 January 2002). “Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan”. Nuclear Weapon Archives, Reuters and Los Angeles Times news reports were used in preparing this article.. Nuclear weapon archives. p. 1. http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Pakistan/AQKhan.html. Retrieved 18 October 2012.
26. ^ a b c d Hamid Mir (3 May 2004). “[Talk Special]”. 1:00 minutes in. Geo Television Network. Geo Television Islamabad Studies.
27. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n Azam, Rai Muhammad Saleh (June 2000). “Where Mountains Move: The Story of Chagai: §Kirana-I”. Rai Muhammad Saleh Azam. Rai Muhammad Saleh Azam, The Nation, Defence Journal, and the Pakistan Military Consortium. Archived from the original on 13 June 2011. http://www.pakdef.info/nuclear&missile/wheremountainsmove.html. Retrieved June 2011.
28. ^ a b Hoodbhoy, Pervez (2001). “Chagai-II: The Plutonium Bomb”. Federation of American Scientists and Pakistan Atomic Scientists Foundation. Federation of American Scientists. http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/pakistan/nuke/. Retrieved 2011.
29. ^ Armstrong, David; Joseph John Trento, National Security News Service. America and the Islamic Bomb: The Deadly Compromise. Steerforth Press, 2007. p. 165. ISBN 1-58642-137-9,9781586421373.
30. ^ “Eye To Eye: An Islamic Bomb”. CBS News. http://www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id=3483035n&tag=mncol;lst;3.
31. ^ http://www.expressindia.com/latest-news/Lankan-Muslims-in-Dubai-supplied-Nmaterials-to-Pak-A-Q-Khan/514870/
32. ^ “On the trail of the black market bombs”. BBC News. 12 February 2004. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3481499.stm.
33. ^ a b c d e f g “Dr. G D Alam Interview with Daily Asas”. Daily Asas. http://www.pakdef.info/forum/showthread.php?12746-Dr.-G-D-Alam-Interview-with-Daily-Asas-and-Lashkar-1998.
36. ^ “Interview of Dr. Samar Mubarak-Head of Pakistan Missile Programme”. Hamid Mir. http://oraclesyndicate.twoday.net/stories/4167731/.
37. ^ a b c d Khan, Abdul Qadeer (June 2010) , “How we developed the programme” (in English and Urdu), Sehar Honay Tak (Until Sunrise), 1, 1, Islamabad, Pakistan:: Ali Masud books publication, p. 158, ISBN 969-8500-00-6
38. ^ a b c John Pike (16 May 2000). “Engineering Research Laboratories (ERL)”. The Federation of American Scientists (John Pike). John Pike of Federation of American Scientists. http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/pakistan/facility/kahuta.htm. Retrieved 24 October 2012.
39. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w Fitzpatrick, Mark (2007). “§Dr. A. Q. Khan and the rise and fall of proliferation network“. Nuclear black markets. London, United Kingdom: International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). ISBN 978-0-86079-201-7.
40. ^ a b c Kan, Shirley A. (2009). “§A.Q. Khan’s nuclear network“. China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy issues. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service (CRS): Congressional Research Service (CRS). pp. 5–6. ISBN Congressional Research Service (CRS).
41. ^ a b c d e f IISS reports. “A.Q. Khan and onward proliferation from Pakistan”. Copyright 2006 – 2012 The International Institute For Strategic Studies. The International Institute For Strategic Studies (IISS).
43. ^ “Documents Indicate A.Q. Khan Offered Nuclear Weapon Designs to Iraq in 1990: Did He Approach Other Countries?” by David Albright and Corey Hinderstein (4 February 2004).
44. ^ David Rohde and David Sanger, “Key Pakistani is Said to Admit Atom Transfers”, The New York Times, 2 February 2004: A1.
46. ^ John Lancaster and Kamran Khan, Musharraf Named in Nuclear Probe: Senior Pakistani Army Officers Were Aware of Technology Transfers, Scientist Says”, The Washington Post, 3 February 2004.
47. ^ Craig S. Smith, “Roots of Pakistan Atomic Scandal Traced to Europe”, The New York Times, 19 February 2004, page A3.
48. ^ a b Bill Powell and Tim McGirk, “The Man Who Sold the Bomb; How Pakistan’s A.Q. Khan outwitted Western intelligence to build a global nuclear-smuggling ring that made the world a more dangerous place”, Time Magazine, 14 February 2005, p. 22.
50. ^ a b c Hersh, Seymour (March 1 2004). “is Washington going easy on Pakistan’s nuclear black marketers?” (google docs). Work by Seymour Hersh, with the assistance from the US government.. The New Yorker. https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&q=cache:zZeDVlZ07iQJ:asr2.myweb.uga.edu/Fall%25202004/Readings/The%2520Deal%2520Why%2520is%2520Washington%2520going%2520easy%2520on%2520Pakistan.doc+edward+teller+a+q+khan&hl=en&gl=us&pid=bl&srcid=ADGEESimG6b18jM13DAC4Cm54gVWkHHd-hn2mcIuBh2Ta0-dN1tCUfkNWqtoYFwFYDeDe_fq_prhYeNU4lrqI_1PWjE_ZuOuScloinPIn3RWy0gx7E0VONY62B5MkW7V191EH-UGSHSU&sig=AHIEtbR-G3K5Lw2ONst7nEmB_StqiUzljg. Retrieved 9 December 2012.
51. ^ Ron Moreau and Zahid Hussain, “Chain of Command; The Military: Musharraf dodged a bullet, but could be heading for a showdown with his Army”, Newsweek, 16 February 2004, p. 20.
52. ^ a b APP, APP (26 October 2007). “Dr. Qadeer’s services unforgettable, says PM Shaukat Aziz”. Pakistan Tribune, 26 October 2007. http://paktribune.com/news/Dr-Qadeers-services-unforgettable-says-PM-Shaukat-Aziz-192877.html. Retrieved 30 May 2012. “The services of Nuclear Scientist Dr. Qadeer Khan are unforgettable for the country; we will not hand him over to any other country…”
53. ^ Gishkor, Zahid (27 August 2012). “AQ Khan set to launch own political party”. The Tribune Express. http://tribune.com.pk/story/426738/aq-khan-set-to-launch-own-political-party/#comment-885355. Retrieved 18 October 2012.
54. ^ “The past and the present (12-Nov-2008)”. A. Q. Khan. http://draqkhan.com.pk/index.php/2008/11/the-past-and-the-present-12-nov-2008/#more-3. Retrieved 2010-09-26.
55. ^ a b c d e f g h i j Pask. “Abdul Qadeer Khan”. Press Directorate Office of the Pakistan Academy of Sciences. Pakistan Academy of Sciences. http://www.paspk.org/detail.php?id=16&id1=124. Retrieved 18 October 2012.
56. ^ a b c d Upadhyaya, Gopal S. (2011). “§Dr. A.Q. Khan of Pakistan”. Men of Metals and Materials: My Memoires. Bloomington, Indiana, United States: iUniverse.com. p. 248pp. ISBN 969-8500-00-6.
57. ^ a b c “Frontiers in Physics”. 13 December 1988. Proceedings of the Second National Symposium on Frontiners in Physics. http://pps-pak.org/proceedings/Second-Proc-1988.pdf. Retrieved 16 January 2012.
58. ^ GEO TV (17 May 2011). “Nuclear capability saved Pakistan”. Geo Television Network (GTN). GEO News (GNews). http://www.geo.tv/5-17-2011/81448.htm. Retrieved 8 December 2011.
59. ^ Khan, Abdul Qadeer. “I saved my country from nuclear blackmail’”. Newsweek; The Tribune; The NTI; various others. http://tribune.com.pk/story/170253/i-saved-my-country-from-nuclear-blackmail/. Retrieved 3 December 2011.
60. ^ a b c Hoodbhoy, Pervez (4 May 1999). “Bombs, Missiles and Pakistani Science: The Chaghi tests, and more recent Ghauri-II and Shaheen-I missile launches, have been deemed heroic symbols of high scientific achievement… Are they?”. Chowk.com. http://www.chowk.com/Views/Science/Bombs-Missiles-and-Pakistani-Science. Retrieved 2011.
61. ^ Khan, Abdul Qadeer. “Islamic Academy of Sciences Fellowship members”. Islamic Academy of Sciences. http://www.ias-worldwide.org/profiles/prof85.htm. Retrieved 1998.
62. ^ Murtaza, Ghulam; Zhahour Ahmad (November (19–21) 1998). “Condense Matter Physics”. Seven National Symposium on Frontiers in Physics. 7 7 (7): 2/3. http://pps-pak.org/proceedings/Seventh-Proc-1998.pdf. Retrieved 16 January 2012.
- Khan, Abdul Qadeer (2010). “§Sehar Honay Tak: Dr. A.Q. Khan gave us the sense of security, Javed Hashmi.”. In Khan, Abdul Qadeer. Sehar Honay Tak. Islamabad, Pakistan: Ali Masud books publication. pp. 1–158. ISBN 969-8500-00-6.
- Upadhyaya, Gopal S. (2011). “§Dr. A.Q. Khan of Pakistan”. Men of Metals and Materials: My Memoires. Bloomington, Indiana, United States: iUniverse.com. p. 248pp. ISBN 969-8500-00-6.
- Rahman, Shahid (1998). “§Dr. A. Q. Khan: Nothing Succeed like Success“. In Rahman, Shahid. Long Road to Chagai. Islamabad, Pakistan: Printwise publication. pp. 49–60. ISBN 969-8500-00-6.
- Fitzpatrick, Mark (2007). “§Dr. A. Q. Khan and the rise and fall of proliferation network“. Nuclear black markets. London, United Kingdom: International Institute for Strategic Studies. ISBN 978-0-86079-201-7.
- Kan, Shirley A. (2009). “§A.Q. Khan’s nuclear network“. China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy issues. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service (CRS). pp. 5–6. ISBN Congressional Research Service (CRS).
- (BIIP), Bureau of International Information Programs (2005). “§A.Q. Khan and the nuclear market“. In Cooney, Thomas E.; Denny, David Anthony. E=mc²: Today’s Nuclear Equation. Washington, DC: United States: Judith S. Seagal. pp. 1–40. ISBN United States Department of State.
 External links
Wikimedia Commons has media related to: Abdul Qadeer Khan
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- Scott-Clark, Adrian Levy & Catherine (2007). Deception : Pakistan, the United States, and the secret trade in nuclear weapons (1st U.S. ed. ed.). New York: Walker & Co.. ISBN 978-0-8027-1554-8. http://books.google.com/books?id=bvRyTJjiBoAC&printsec=frontcover&dq=A+Q+Khan&source=bl&ots=zHvFmi7qsM&sig=_cFCtK-lbRMZxRCE5deNBNpxp6w&hl=en&sa=X&ei=znuAUJP6LovhigKAyIHoCQ&ved=0CEoQ6AEwBQ#v=onepage&q=A%20Q%20Khan&f=false.
- Upadhyaya, Gopal S.. “Dr. A.Q. Khan of Pakistan”. Men of metals and materials : my memoirs. Bloomington, IN: iUniverse. pp. 138. ISBN 978-1-4620-1840-6. http://books.google.com/books?id=w9_-VuflpjoC&pg=PA138&lpg=PA138&dq=Men+of+Metal+A+Q+Khan&source=bl&ots=w2_erA6Ty9&sig=eursyz6oFv-cyFpVJSu2CbXYVrY&hl=en&sa=X&ei=NX2AUKGPDcmkiQLs74HQDw&ved=0CDIQuwUwAA#v=onepage&q=Men%20of%20Metal%20A%20Q%20Khan&f=false. Retrieved 18 October 2012.